Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis

Fiscal Crisis in Chicago: Pensions 31% Funded, Moody's Downgrades Debt 3 Notches, Pension Liability is $61,000 Per Household; Mish's Proposed Solutions
Grand Coalition or Grand Discontent, Mistrust and Disrespect? Political Poker Revisited
M1 Money Supply vs. Real GDP

Fiscal Crisis in Chicago: Pensions 31% Funded, Moody's Downgrades Debt 3 Notches, Pension Liability is $61,000 Per Household; Mish's Proposed Solutions

Posted: 17 Sep 2013 01:27 PM PDT

Move over Detroit. The fiscal crisis in Chicago is far bigger.

Pensions 31% funded
Moody's downgraded Chicago Debt 3 Notches (just 4 steps above junk)
City debt on negative watch
Pension Liability is $61,000 Per Household ($23,000 Per Capita)

Via email, Ted Dabrowski at the Illinois Policy Center writes ...

While all eyes are focused on a solution for Illinois' state-run pension systems, Chicago's own debt crisis is looming.

Chicago taxpayers are on the hook for more than $63 billion in pension, health insurance and other debt. That's the total debt of the city and its sister governments, as well as Chicagoans' share of Cook County debt.

In total, each Chicago household is on the hook for more than $61,000.

Chicago's pension crisis isn't new, but Detroit's bankruptcy has brought national attention to Chicago's growing crisis. Just a day after Detroit filed for bankruptcy, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Chicago's debt by a rare three notches. Chicago is now just four notches away from junk-bond status — and any further downgrades mean the city could face problems borrowing money.

Without pension reform, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel will be forced to raise taxes or dramatically cut government services.

Emanuel knows he can't raise taxes. Chicago has lost more than 200,000 residents in the last decade and the city's population is lower now than it was in the 1920s.

To make matters worse, Chicago's services are already faltering. Chicago Public Schools closed nearly 50 schools this year, forcing children and families to travel across gang lines. Nearly 3,000 school employees have been laid off. And the city's crime rate is among the worst in the nation.

Higher taxes, taxpayer flight and an inability to provide core services contributed to Detroit's demise — and it's a trend that Chicago must reverse.

Fixing Chicago's pension crisis will require help from Springfield. Lawmakers need to follow the lead of the private sector and move all workers to 401(k)-style plans for all work going forward — an idea that Emanuel supports as an option for the city's new hires.

Ted Dabrowski
Vice President of Policy

The Hidden Bill

You can view the entire report at The hidden bill: Chicago taxpayers and the looming crisis.

A closer look at the "Hidden Bill" shows the problem is even worse than stated by Dabrowski above.

Pension funds have long assumed unrealistically high investment returns, which make the funds look healthier than they actually are. Moody's Investors Service now calculates unfunded pension liabilities using more appropriate discount rates.

Under new Moody's methodology, Chicago's unfunded pension liabilities are at least $23 billion higher than what's officially reported. Today, the systems have only 31 cents for every dollar
they should have to make necessary pension payouts in the future.

When summing up Chicago's total debt, it's necessary to use the Moody's calculation of unfunded pension liabilities instead of those officially reported by the city. That's because the municipal bond market depends heavily on Moody's ratings when investing in Chicago bonds.

Moody's based its recent triple-notch downgrade of the city's debt on the agency's new methodology for valuing pension shortfalls. The downgrade has led to a collapse in Chicago's bond prices and a significant increase in its borrowing rates.

Chicago's credit rating is now only four notches away from junk-bond status. Many institutional investors are not allowed to invest in junk bonds, meaning the city will face significant
pressure in accessing the bond market going forward if this downward trend continues.

Ignoring the Moody's pension calculation not only understates the severity of Chicago's debt crisis, but also the true burden that Chicago taxpayers may be forced to shoulder.

If you adjust pension obligations for a more realistic rate of return, the problem looks like this.

Chicago Obligations

Chicago Pension Funding

Four Long Term Solutions

Kill defined benefit pension plans
End collective bargaining for public unions
Institute national right-to-work laws
Scrap Davis-Bacon and all prevailing wage laws

The above long-term solutions will stop the problem from growing as well as ensure labor costs are market-priced, not union-priced.

I wish that was enough but it isn't. Those things will slow the rate of growth of the problem, but cannot address 77% pension underfunding.

Two Short Term Solution

Pension cutbacks
Healthcare benefit cutbacks

Pension and benefit cuts are necessary, but how best to do it?

I propose the burden of pension cuts spread out in an equitable manner with those receiving the highest benefits taking the biggest percentage cuts.

All pension income above a certain cap could be taxed at a very high rate. This would protect the smaller pensioners from massive haircuts.

The alternative, as we saw in Central Falls, Rhode Island Bankruptcy, was an across the board 50% pension haircut.

Someone with a $200,000 pension had it cut to $100,000. Someone with a $25,000 pension had it cut to $12,500.

My proposal would cap the top-end rather than applying uniform haircuts. If one picks the cap carefully, a majority of union members would fare better under my plan than bankruptcy.

The Union Choice

Public unions can scream all they want, but the entire defined benefit pension system is insolvent.
There is no choice other than pension haircuts. There is a choice as to how:

Voluntary (via union agreement)
Involuntary (via bankruptcy)

Bankruptcy Here We Come

Unfortunately, unions are highly unlikely to accept my common sense proposal.

Ultimately, Chicago will play around with superficial remedies just like Central Falls, Detroit, and several cities in California (all of which succumbed to the inevitable).

In the meantime, Chicago will probably follow some other major cities into bankruptcy, such as Oakland and Los Angeles.

Investors better pick their municipal bonds carefully, because some major hits are on the way.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com

Grand Coalition or Grand Discontent, Mistrust and Disrespect? Political Poker Revisited

Posted: 17 Sep 2013 11:44 AM PDT

After saying "nein" to a grand black-red CDU/CSU + SPD coalition led by CDU (Angela Merkel), SPD party candidate Peer Steinbrück changed his mind and said he was willing to form such a coalition.

Political Poker Revisited

I discussed the reasons for the switch in Political Poker in Germany.

Was Steinbrück lying then, or now? Or both? Is this a game to win votes? Or a real change of heart? Or no change of heart, just a lie the entire time?

Quite frankly, I do not know. What I do know is that, in general, politicians will lie cheat and steal to stay in power.

Should the opportunity present itself, would Steinbrück enter a coalition with Die Linke even though he said he wouldn't?

Why not? He said he would not enter one with CDU/CSU and changed his mind. Might not he do so again? Might this all be a game of political poker?

Grand Coalition or Grand Opposition?

Today, Der Spiegel discussed the power play in Possible SPD coalition with Merkel: Gabriel's power issue. The translation is particularly difficult, but this is what I have.

Here Steinbrück, There Steinbrück, Everywhere Steinbrück

In the last days before the election, the SPD chancellor candidate has switched to ubiquity. Radio, market places, and the "Halli Galli circus". The point is to organize as many votes as possible for his party.

Then Steinbrück will be gone. What's next falls on SPD Chairman Sigmar Gabriel.

"We fight for red-green, nothing else," Gabriel says. however, some party members think, recognize a certain sympathy for a black-red alliance with him to.

Not Quite So Simple

Gabriel is facing difficult weeks. After the election, the SPD leader may need to lead his party into a grand coalition. But this variant is hated by many party members. How will this all go well?

In many parts of the SPD-Black Red is hated. Gabriel knows this, he has a good feel for the party spirit.

Internally, SPD announced it will involve members in some form on a decision on the next coalition. But how? Gabriel runs the risk that the party makes him a spanner in the works. [Mish note: a spanner is a German instrument for widening springs].

No less complicated is the question of how a new edition of the grand coalition would actually look like four years later. A grand coalition would shift the center of power of the SPD to a cabinet post in Merkel's administration, but the Chancellor outshines everything. How does a puppet role help the party in the next election?

And what talents does Gabriel have? He is not qualified for finance minister and does not find Merkel's stance on many issues appealing in the first place.

So it's foreign minister? In the the Foreign Office, he's out of the domestic political debate. Germans might be able to sleep a little quieter, but the party without him would have more difficulty distinguishing themselves from the Union. No optimal conditions for the next election.

Everything Complicated

In general, a grand coalition would make the next election problematic with a Red-Red-Green (SPD + Greens + Left) coalition even less conceivable than now. Can Gabriel afford that?

Grand Coalition or Grand Discontent, Mistrust and Disrespect?

Reader Bernd, who sent me the above link wrote...

Hello Mish,

An interesting article by "Der Spiegel" about the possible power struggle within SPD regarding a Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU/SPD).

Der Spiegel is usually extremely well informed about SPD and the parties' inner feelings and structure.

Der Spiegel article finds it difficult to fathom a Grand Coalition, because the majority of SPD leaders, members and Parlamentarians dislike the possibilty immensely and dislike Mm Merkel so intensely.

The article does not show a way out, but tells the reader: if a grand coalition comes ahout at all, it will be one of discontent, mistrust and disrespect. Not a good omen for the work that lies ahead in Europe.

Bernd

Grand Coalition More Complicated Than It Looks

Everything is more complicated than it looks. If a "Grand Coalition" is in the works, don't expect it to be very stable.

And this is why CDU/CSU hopes to attain a majority without depending on any alliances.

If AfD and FDP do not make the 5% threshold, CDU/CSU can get an outright majority. But if AfD totals 7% or more it is going to be very difficult if not impossible.

CDU/CSU will then have to form a coalition with someone. What poison will it be?

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com

M1 Money Supply vs. Real GDP

Posted: 17 Sep 2013 02:13 AM PDT

Here are a few interesting charts of M1 money supply vs. Real GDP/10 from reader WendyBG.

Data

M1 consists of: (1) currency outside the U.S. Treasury, Federal reserve Banks, and the vaults of depository institutions; (2) traveler's checks of nonbank issuers; (3) demand deposits; and (4) other checkable deposits (OCDs), which consist primarily of negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts at depository institutions and credit union share draft accounts.

Click on any chart to see a sharper image.

M1 vs. Real GDP/10 1959-Present

M1 vs. Real GDP/10 2000-Present

M1 vs. Annualized Change in Real GDP

The third chart shows annualized change in GDP vs. M1.

Increases in M1 no longer have the same effect on growth or jobs.

M1 as Percentage of GDP

M1 money supply has increased under Bernanke at a faster pace than ever before relative to GDP.

I will take a look at GDP vs. other money supply measures later this week.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com

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Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis

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